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ABSTRACT  Health-care systems are highly diverse, sometimes even sharing few basic aspects 
of design. In developing countries, demographic profiles, poverty, the labour 
market and public finances are such that a comprehensive approach to solidarity 
—combining contributory and non-contributory mechanisms— is essential. In 1981, 
Chile redesigned the contributory component of its system by means of private 
health-insurance companies. The rationale of private, individual insurance runs 
counter to the ethical imperatives of contracts based on social rights. In Europe, 
this dilemma has been tackled using risk-levelling mechanisms that resolve the 
conflict between accessibility, efficiency and selection. In Chile, competitive health 
insurance companies (Isapres) coexist with a solidarity-based State alternative, the 
National Health Fund (FONASA). The Isapres engage in aggressive risk selection. The 
challenge for health policy is to integrate the two systems to balance the principles 
of equivalence and solidarity. 
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of contributory and non-contributory funding, aiming to 
extend health services to the entire population through 
solidarity from rich to poor, from young to elderly, from 
the healthy to the sick. 
In its publication Shaping the Future of Social 
Protection: Access, Financing and Solidarity, the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (eclac, 2006) identifies three types of 
interaction between public financing and social security 
contributions (see table 1):
Type 1: integrated system based on non-contributory 
financing. 
Type 2A: integrated system which retains contributory 
financing and a single level of coverage delivered via 
social security. 
Type 2B: integrated system with coverage differentiated 
between contributory and non-contributory financing. 
Type 3: systems with little or no integration. 
Chile uses a modality of articulation between 
the public and social-security systems, which may 
be construed as dual and partial. Its key feature 
is segmentation, inasmuch as mandatory health 
contributions can be paid to either of two health 
insurance systems that operate in parallel but have 
very different rationales. Contributors must choose 
between the National Health Fund (fonasa), a public 
health insurance scheme, and private health-insurance 
policies offered by companies called Isapres, which 
operate within the social security domain.
The funding of the public system and social security 
are articulated in the framework of fonasa, which 
is financed from the contributions paid by affiliates, 
supplemented from general tax revenues (in the case 
of individuals who are unable to contribute). Insofar 
as the system is financed in this combined manner 
and individuals may access benefits independently of 
their contributions, fonasa provides risk and income 
solidarity. However, the duality of the system and the 
individual nature of insurance in Isapres create obstacles 
to full integration of financing and to greater equity. 
Higher-income individuals tend to enrol in the Isapre 
system, especially at the stage of the life in which health 
I
Introduction
A large body of literature exists analysing the conditions 
under which individual insurance schemes are useful for 
financing public health systems. The research explores 
why health insurance markets —in which subscribers are 
free to choose between insurance companies— generate 
heavy incentives not only for efficiency, but also for risk 
classification, segmentation and selection, which runs 
counter to the normative framework of social protection 
as it refers to health. Given that universal access is one 
of the main objectives of social insurance schemes, 
whereas markets for individual insurance impose a variety 
of selection processes, the basic question arises: Can 
high-risk individuals be assured of accessible coverage 
in an individual health insurance market? 
The problem is that competitive markets tend to 
seek “equivalence” between the premium and the costs 
each contract is expected to generate. They are, therefore, 
poorly placed to provide “solidarity” by offsetting the 
probable losses arising from contracts with high-risk 
individuals with the profits presumed to flow from 
contracts with low-risk individuals, precisely because 
competition minimizes foreseeable profits. 
Insurance companies make use of a variety of 
selection mechanisms:
- Risk classification: adjusting the insurance premium 
for each plan to individual risk.
- Risk segmentation: adjusting the insurance plan 
(i.e. benefit coverage and design) to attract different 
risk groups to each plan and charge a premium 
accordingly. 
- Risk selection: adjusting subscribers’ risk to the 
premium set for a given health plan.
Steps were taken in the third generation of reforms 
to Latin America’s health systems to combat these effects, 
including explicit guarantees in Chile, the model of 
the Single Health System (sus) in Brazil, the creation 
of the National Integrated Health System in Uruguay, 
and regulated competition in Colombia. These were all 
efforts to work towards universal access through a mix 
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risks are relatively low; accordingly, they pay high 
contributions and carry low risk, but do not participate 
in contributory solidarity.
This paper examines this dilemma with reference 
to Chile, as a case of individual insurance schemes in 
the context of Latin America. The work is organized as 
follows: Section II discusses the implications of risk 
selection for well-being, section III draws lessons from 
the European experience and section IV looks at the 
implications for Chile. Section V concludes. 
TABLE 1
latin america and the caribbean: combinations of public funding and social security 
contributions in the health sector
Type 1
Financing: general revenues, integrated 
systems based on non-contributory financing
Type 2
Financing: integration of general revenues and 
social security contributions
Type 3
Financing: little or no integration of general 
revenues and social security contributions
Services are structurally varied between 
public and private providers
In all cases there is some degree of explicit 
separation between financing and service 
delivery functions. The level of integration of 
financing also varies
The structure of public services is 
heterogeneous, and different types of 
relationship exist between the public and 
private sectors
Public and private service provision: 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,a Jamaica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) b 
Service provision through the public system 
only: Cuba
Type 2A: Integrated, maintaining contributory 
financing and uniform set of services delivered 
via social security: Costa Rica
Type 2B: Integrated with coverage 
differentiated by contributory status: Antigua 
and Barbuda,c Colombia, Dominican Republicc
Type 2C: Dual model with partial integration: 
Chile
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac).
Note: In all countries, except Cuba, there is also a private subsector that provides health services.
a In Haiti there is practically no social security, and the provision and financing of health services are undertaken basically by the public sector 
and non-governmental organizations (ngos).
b The reforms of the last few years have elicited greater participation and coverage in the public system.
c  Both Antigua and Barbuda and the Dominican Republic are in a transition period, implementing health reforms aimed at greater integration 
of financing.
II
conceptual considerations on health-care equity 
1.  equity-driven interventions in  
the health-care market1
Equity in health-care provision has to do with notions 
of social justice. As applied to health, economic 
theory distinguishes two forms of equity: horizontal 
and vertical. Horizontal equity as it refers to health is 
equal treatment for people with equal needs.2 The idea 
1 Adapted from Barr (2003).
2  This means that people with the same clinical needs should receive 
the same clinical treatment; equal access for equal needs; equal 
resources used for equal expected health outcomes; equal funds per 
capita for equal needs.
of vertical equity is that individuals of different types 
should be treated differently.3 
Looked at in this manner, there are three arguments 
for intervening in the health-care market. First, to 
distribute information and power and ensure horizontal 
equity, thereby endowing affiliates in the system with 
perfect information and equal power to take decisions 
and access the various health plans the system has to 
offer. But access to information is costly and the ability 
3  In taxation terms, this means that individuals with greater resources 
should pay more tax (or larger contributions to the health system) than 
the poor, thereby generating solidary redistribution from rich to poor. 
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to understand rights is unequal: this systematically 
disadvantages poorer socioeconomic groups and ultimately 
restricts their options. The solutions include regulation 
to ensure minimum standards,4 price subsidies (for 
prescriptions, for example), income subsidies (monetary 
transfers) and, in extreme cases, State assignation or 
production, or both. 
Second, to include consumption externalities, to 
make the rich pay higher premiums than the poor to 
consume the same quantity (or plan).5 This may be 
rationalized in terms of concern for the needs of others, 
whether for reasons of national efficiency6 or altruism.7
The third argument is that health care is a public 
good and as such should be exempted from economic 
calculations and provided outside the market. There are 
ethical and philosophical reasons that justify a morally 
superior method of distribution. But health care is also 
an economic good, which includes rivalries (the time a 
doctor devotes to one patient is time denied to another) 
and exclusivity (health care competes for resources with 
other possible allocations), which makes it a private 
good. So, although health care is a morally superior 
good, serious allocation problems arise if it is left to a 
market of pure competition governed by the forces of 
supply and demand with no intervention by some kind 
of authority. In this case, intervention is necessary to 
ensure the good’s provision.
These notions give rise to several roles for the 
State. The first is that health care should be treated as 
a merit good to be distributed among the population 
in accordance with certain equity criteria and access 
should depend on need. Hence the importance that 
resources should be distributed by the State (either by 
setting down minimum health-care standards for the 
most vulnerable, or by limiting the current inequities 
in access to health care).
The second role for the State is to close information 
gaps with regulatory policies to shed light on complex 
biological processes, accredit professionals and services, 
4 Of the professional qualifications of nurses and doctors, and of 
medicines, treatments and medical facilities, in both public and private 
sectors, in order to ensure that horizontal equity is satisfied.
5 Or to ensure that if the rich consume twice as much as the poor, 
they also pay twice as high a contribution.
6 Given that access to health services improves the quality of the 
workforce, labour productivity and economic growth, and that meeting 
the health-care needs of the most vulnerable averts social discontent. 
7 That is, the distribution of health care per se, in which health 
care is transferred to the poor in kind. Thus they are acknowledged 
as rights-bearing citizens, whereas targeted monetary transfers are 
perceived in terms of welfarism and poverty stigmatization.
make health insurance plans transparent and avoid 
adverse selection.
A third role for the State is to invest directly or 
indirectly in health and health-care infrastructure (public 
drainage, hospitals and health posts, etc.) and in training 
health professionals. The complexity of these investments 
and the advanced knowledge and technology they require 
make them public goods which should be provided or 
subsidized by the State. 
Lastly, a fourth role is lies in the regulation and tax 
treatment of goods generated by health status externalities, 
whether positive (physical activity, clean environment, 
and so forth) or negative (tobacco addiction, sedentary 
lifestyle, obesity, among others). 
2.  The scheme of health-care financing is not 
equity-neutral
The way the financing structure of the health-care system 
is designed imposes major limitations on social justice. 
Financing structure is usually designed around three 
alternatives: (i) production and allocation by the market 
(with or without insurance); (ii) intermediate strategies, 
and (iii) production and allocation by the State.
(a) Provision by the market only, without insurance
If health-care provision is treated as an economic 
good and delivered in market of pure competition, without 
insurance, then consumption will be limited by price. 
The equilibrium quantity may exceed (uncompetitive 
supply-side behaviour) or undershoot the optimum level 
(unincorporated externalities, uncompetitive supply-side 
behaviour, or both). The outcome will be inefficient 
allocation of total resources (macro-inefficiency) and of the 
volume and placement of benefits among the alternatives 
(micro-inefficiency). As well as inefficient, the system 
will be unequal, since health care will be determined 
by income distribution, and these inequalities will be 
greater where knowledge and power are correlated with 
income (the poor are the most disadvantaged), and in the 
presence of a perfect capital market and the absence of 
insurance. The end result will be underconsumption of 
the health-care “good”, especially by the poorest and 
most at-risk.
(b) Provision by the market only, with insurance
Those on the demand side of the health-care equation 
face uncertainty, because as patients they do not know 
how much health care they will need or when they will 
need it. Neither do they know the outcome probabilities 
for different treatments or the relative efficiency of the 
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various health-care providers. One solution is to enter 
the health-insurance market. Where insurance pays all 
medical bills, consumption is not limited by price and 
is determined by the supplier. The uncertainty of the 
patient demand curve thus becomes less important.
But insurance markets can have a perverse impact 
on health-care market outcomes:8 moral hazard exists 
wherever the doctor has no supply-side incentives 
to ration demand. There will be a tendency towards 
overconsumption of benefits, because payment by a third 
party (the insurer) generates incentives towards waste 
and overuse. “Social inequity” exists with insurance, too, 
because some individuals are unable to buy an insurance 
scheme: the poor, the elderly and the chronically ill and 
others who, without being any of these things, simply 
cannot afford premiums driven up to inaccessible levels by 
overconsumption in the insurance market. This problem 
is exacerbated by insurance companies’ use of selection 
mechanisms: be it by classifying risk by adjusting the 
premium for each plan to individual risk; segmenting risk 
by adjusting the plan (i.e. benefit coverage and design) 
to attract different risk groups to each plan and charge 
a premium accordingly; or selecting risk by adjusting 
affiliates’ risk to the premium set in the plan.9
3.  intermediate strategies: the public-private mix
One solution to these dilemmas is a health system 
somewhere between public and private model. The 
design of such a system must be: (i) more efficient 
and equitable than the other solutions, and (ii) more 
acceptable, politically speaking, than other arrangements. 
There are two coherent types of mixed strategies. 
One, where health care is delivered by some kind of 
health maintenance organization (hmo),10 affiliation 
is mandatory and insurance premiums are paid by the 
individual (or by income transfers for the poor). The 
8  This can occur is five conditions are met: (i) the probability of 
needing treatment must be independent from one individual to another; 
(ii) it must be less than 1; (iii) it must be known or estimable; (iv) it 
must not be able to be hidden (adverse selection), and (v) it cannot 
be manipulated (moral hazard). 
9  This does not imply that competitive private markets cannot exist 
for health-care inputs (meals, beds, medicines, towels, X-ray machines, 
and so forth). What is more, private input suppliers probably make 
that market become more efficient and preferable.
10  An hmo is a private corporation holding contracts with doctors, 
hospitals and employers, which provides individual health insurance 
in exchange for a fixed cost or premium. Individuals must choose a 
primary care physician within the hmo network, through whom all 
health-care decisions will be channelled (medication, hospitalization, 
tests and referrals).
other, when health care is delivered privately (not via an 
hmo), paid by the State (directly, through social security, 
or through a regulated medical insurance) and the total 
product or expenditure is controlled by the State, either 
directly or through a general budget cap. 
(a) Health-care production 
In a mixed (public-private) system, the idea 
is to prevent out-of-pocket payments or third-party 
contributions from creating efficiency disparities or 
impeding the incorporation of externalities. Moral 
hazard must also be avoided by monitoring physicians’ 
decisions, either by administrative measures or by 
budget constraints. Externalities are internalized by 
aligning the activities of the physician with those of 
the insurance company, forcing doctors to assume the 
marginal social costs of treatment prescribed. In hmos 
the doctors themselves are the insurance providers, 
which internalizes the externalities and eliminates the 
incentive to overprescribe. In other cases, a limited 
network of doctors or a preferred provider organization 
(ppo) delivers administered health-insurance plans. In 
this case, an insured person receiving treatment from a 
preferred provider need pay only the pre-established co-
payments. This sort of plan enables affiliates to predict 
out-of-pocket expenditures. The insurance company 
then pays the rest of the cost of treatment to the provider 
without involving the insured party.
A ppo differs from an hmo in that the insured party is 
freer to seek treatment outside the network of physicians 
and hospitals, and is not limited to the insurer’s own 
resources. Different tools are used to protect the quality 
and cost of care, including oversight of the programmes 
administered, changes in the way physicians are paid, 
education programmes and restrictions on provider 
networks.
(b) Financing health care
There are two types of intermediate organizations:
 
—  Private financing, complemented by the State: 
Three groups may be identified in this system: 
(i) the non-poor, (ii) the uninsurable (elderly, children and 
expectant mothers, poor and non-poor with congenital 
and/or chronic illnesses), and (iii) the poor. 
For the non-poor, the system operates through 
private insurance, subject to two types of regulation: 
threshold standards of coverage and the obligation to 
ensure that no externalities are associated with non-
insurance (adverse selection). 
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For the other two groups, the solution falls to the 
State, which subsidizes private insurance premiums 
fully, partially or both, as the case may be. Here, three 
problems arise: (i) a targeting problem related to the 
definition of health-care problems to be included, what 
guarantees of assistance the State will offer and what 
income level will trigger subsidization; (ii) developing 
the institutions to monitor and avoid oversupply, and 
(iii) the moral hazard that arises in this sort of scheme 
when rich individuals try to qualify as poor in order to 
secure State assistance.
— Social security: 
The State pays medical bills through social security 
or general taxes. These are multi-payer systems in which 
health care is delivered indirectly. The best known system 
of this type is Germany’s. Usually, the system is funded 
principally from payroll taxes. An analytically equivalent 
arrangement is obligatory affiliation to private, regulated 
and non-profit insurance institutions which act as agents of 
the State. This arrangement has two advantages: (i) since 
the scheme is obligatory, it encourages premium-setting 
by payment capacity, rather than by risk, with no loss of 
efficiency, and (ii) its universal coverage (of individuals 
and risks) sidesteps the difficulties of setting limits. 
Such social security institutions, because they are not 
strictly actuarial (for example, in not adjusting premiums 
to individual risk levels) can avoid the weaknesses of 
individual private insurance schemes.
4.  production, allocation and financing by the state
With State financing, the production of health care, 
quality control and the role of the insurance companies 
therein is assumed to be justified by imperfect consumer 
information. These two forms of oversight could be 
more effective if health care was produced by the 
State. It is also assumed that State production solves 
the problems of imperfect information of private 
insurance companies (the problems of the third-party 
payer), and makes all medical conditions insurable. It 
is also said to avoid large and inefficient increases in 
the production of health care. 
This option is debatable inasmuch as it requires 
two conditions to be fulfilled: that the conditions for 
market efficiency fail (information problems), and that 
public production and allocation are less efficient than 
any other alternative (which is harder to establish). 
This would mean proving that: (i) the treatment 
physicians decide upon largely resolves the difficulties 
arising from consumer ignorance; (ii) if it is financed 
(almost entirely) from general taxes, health care is 
largely free and excludes no one; (iii) if doctors receive 
little or no payment for their services, the incentives for 
oversupply by a third payer are reduced, and (iv) health 
care is rationed explicitly, partly by administrative 
measures, partly by the existence of budgetary limits. 
The idea is to limit the overconsumption generated by 
moral hazard. 
III
The international experience with  
private health insurance markets11
At the international level, it is worrisome that in health 
insurance markets, in which subscribers are free to 
choose between insurers, strong incentives arise for 
insurance companies not only to seek efficiency, but 
also to classify, segment and select risk.12 This runs 
11 On the basis of Van de Ven and Schut (2011).
12 In this regard, it will be recalled that: (i) classifying risk is adjusting 
the insurance premium for each product according to individual risk; 
(ii) segmenting risk is adjusting the product (i.e. benefit coverage and 
design) the attract certain groups for each product and charge them 
premiums accordingly, and (iii) selecting risk is adjusting accepted 
risk to the premium set for a given product.
counter to the principle of universal access, one of the 
main objectives of social security schemes. The question 
then arises: 
How can high-risk individuals be assured of 
accessible coverage in an individual health 
insurance market?
Within the intermediate solutions discussed 
in the previous section, a number of countries have 
developed formulas for guaranteeing accessible coverage 
for high-risk groups in individual health insurance 
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markets. A system of “risk-adjusted subsidies” is the 
preferred form of subsidy for making individual health 
insurance accessible in a competitive insurance market 
in which the consumer is free to choose an insurance 
company. In this approach, insurers are free to charge 
risk-adjusted premiums. 
A comparison of five countries with insurance 
including obligatory health plans (see table 2), shows 
that in all cases consumers have a period to choose 
between insurers (health plans), which are responsible 
for buying them or providing them with the care they 
need. In all cases there are strict regulations on the 
premium paid directly by the consumer; however, 
all have imperfect risk-adjustment formulas. For that 
reason, insurers (health plans) have strong financial 
incentives for risk selection, which undermines solidarity, 
efficiency and care quality. Unless improvements are 
made to risk-adjustment formulas, risk selection is 
only likely to increase. This has become particularly 
serious in Germany and Switzerland. The analysis of 
the five cases concluded that public policy would be 
well advised to afford a high priority to improving 
risk-adjustment formulas. This can be achieved more 
readily by incorporating factors to adjust for morbidity. 
This same conclusion was found to be valid for other 
countries with competitive health insurance markets or 
insurance schemes like those in Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Ireland, the 
Russian Federation, Slovenia, Poland and the United 
States. Arriving at good adjustments for morbidity 
risk is the only effective strategy13 for avoiding risk 
selection without loss of solidarity and without distorting 
competition between health risk plans.
 Political, economic and pragmatic considerations 
come into determining how payment of risk-adjusted 
subsidies is organized. In practice, all the counties 
which use risk-adjusted subsidies stipulate the subsidy 
to the insurer, which reduces the consumer’s premium 
by the per capita subsidy allowed by the adjustment 
mechanism to insure that consumer. This approach to 
organizing subsidies is termed “risk equalization”. It uses 
13  Strictly speaking, the affirmation of “only strategy” is valid only 
taking into account the specific weight of pure goods, such as preventive 
aspects, the lifestyles promoted and, therefore, the role that national 
health systems should place in preventive care and promoting health 
(Wilkinson, 2006).
age and sex as risk adjusters, often alongside indicators 
of disability and institutional status and well-being. 
Thus far, only the Netherlands and the United States 
(Medicare14) have used morbidity-adjustment factors. 
Risk-adjusted subsidies or “risk equalization” can 
be complemented with three mechanisms: (i) premium-
based subsidies; (ii) offsets for excessive losses, or 
(iii)  implicit cross-subsidies through restrictions on 
premiums for certain types of coverage. The better the 
premium subsidy is adjusted for relevant risk factors, 
the less necessary these three strategies and the less 
conflict there will be.
In practice, the most popular complementary 
strategy is community rating, which consists of obliging 
insurers to charge every affiliate the same premium for 
the same product, regardless of individual risk. This 
practice has short-term advantages, such as greater 
equity and service access. In the long term, it can make 
the system insolvent, mainly owing to the disincentives 
to provide good care to the chronically ill or, even if 
those incentives are well structured, can make the system 
unsustainable over time. 
At least half the countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) 
have opted to provide tax subsidies to promote the 
purchase of private health insurance (deductions from 
taxable income). Some of these subsidies are quite 
considerable, such as in the case of Australia, with a 
30% premium tax rebate and in the United States, with 
a 35% tax subsidy on health insurance. The analysis 
concludes that great strides could be made in terms 
of efficiency if premium subsidies were replaced by 
risk-adjusted subsidies.
The analysis of those five cases concludes that 
although a good risk equalization strategy helps to 
resolve the conflict between accessibility, efficiency 
and selection in a competitive individual insurance 
market, these strategies are still imperfect and need more 
investment in improving risk equalizing mechanisms. 
Such investment should include better databases and 
research and development of better risk adjusters.
14  Social security programme administered by the Government of 
the United States, which provides medical care for persons over age 
65 and operates as a form of personal insurance.
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TABLE 2
international experience with risk adjustment and distribution




Zero High (but none for 
pensioners)
High Zero High
Free choice of 
programme
Yes Limited for 60% of 
affiliates
Yes No Yes, but insurers 
allowed to charge the 
elderly more
Coverage restrictions Solidarity 
contribution to 
the health system, 
which distributed it 
equitably to insurers
Fixed percentage 
of contribution for 
pensioners, but 
variable for those 
paying into the system
Solidarity contribution 




the health system, 
which distributed it 
equitably to insurers
Contribution 
regardless of risk and 
income 
Problems of selection No Yes Yes Yes No
Situation post-reform (year 2000)
Adjustment 
variables and use of 
information 
7 variables using 
retrospective 
information 
5 variables using 
retrospective 
information
One variable using 
prospective information
5 variables using 
prospective 
information
3 variables using 
prospective 
information
Premium system and 
solidarity fund 
One community 
rating per insurer; 
a percentage of 
this premium 
goes directly to a 
solidarity fund
Fixed percentage 
of income for each 
insurer. Then insurer 
transfers a portion to 
a solidarity fund
No direct contribution 
to insurer, but direct 
contribution to a 
solidarity fund
One community 
rating per insurer; 
a percentage of 
this premium 
goes directly to a 
solidarity fund
One community rating 
per insurer and region, 
a percentage of this 
premium goes directly 









capital costs of 
hospitals
Financial responsibility 
for capital costs of 
hospitals through a 
payment included in 
per diem premiums.
Financial 
responsibility for up 




capital costs of 
hospitals
Risk sharing Proportional, all 
eventualities
No obligation to 
share risk
Conditioned by 
payment of expenses 
(ceiling 6%) of 5 
serious illnesses. There 





No obligation to 
share risk
Source: W.P.M.M. Van de Ven and others, “Risk adjustment and risk selection on the sickness fund insurance market in five European countries”, 
Health Policy, vol. 65, No. 1, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2003.
IV
The chilean experience with individual  
health insurance
The structure of Chile’s health system was reformed 
by decree-law (No.3) in 1981. An individual health 
insurance system was created whereby, to avoid adverse 
selection, workers must pay in 7% of monthly income. 
Workers choose to pay their 7% into the public health 
fund (fonasa) or into the private system (Isapres). In the 
absence of regulation, this modality —which essentially 
has the merit of forcing higher earners to pay more— does 
not guarantee access to a health system in which risks 
are shared and solidarity assured.15
15  In fact, changes have been made almost continually to the Chilean 
health system and have been much more extensive than the creation of 
private insurance and the transformation of the Employees’ National 
Medical Service (sermena) into fonasa, but a full account is beyond 
the scope of this work.
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The private market has offered insurance that is fair, 
in actuarial terms, at the level of each individual contract, 
but which encourages risk selection by the Isapres and 
impedes the solidarity necessary for a social covenant 
on health. Solidarity operates only when subscribers 
migrate to fonasa. In effect, the health system segmented 
subscriber contributions to reflect the inequalities ingrained 
in Chilean society, making the reform regressive in terms 
of the contributory health system. In 2010, payments of 
mandatory premiums amounted to 2.2 billion Chilean pesos 
(Ch$) —equivalent to 2.1% of gross domestic product 
(gdp)16— of which 45.2% (Ch$ 974 million) was collected 
by the Isapres, which cover only 16.5% of the population. 
The average obligatory monthly premium, which would 
have been Ch$ 16,040 pesos had all insurance remained 
public, was, in practice, Ch$ 28,650 for Isapre subscribers 
and just Ch$ 11,770 for those in fonasa. The Isapres have 
been able to engage in heavy indirect risk selection by 
oversupplying health plans, which discriminate by risk 
and income, in addition to inequity in access to benefits.
1.  The options in the case of chile
The existing health system has both public and private 
financing. Both public and private providers produce 
health services and, depending on whether subscribers 
are in the private Isapre system or in the public system 
(fonasa), they are free to choose between public or private 
suppliers, or both. However, individuals enrolled in the 
fonasa institutional care modality (mai) may receive 
treatment only in State establishments. In addition, 
benefits included in the Regime of Explicit Health 
Guarantees (rges) are financed in the public system 
with State contributions in the health-care network 
established for the purpose, and in the private system, 
through higher contributions from affiliates treated in 
the establishments determined by each Isapre. 
2.  data and evidence17
With the inclusion of insurance markets as a financing 
mechanism, despite the obligatory contribution of 
16  Data from the Central Bank of Chile, the Superintendence of Health 
and fonasa.
17 Data for the preparation of this paper were taken from the National 
Socioeconomic Survey (casen) of 2009. casen is run by the Ministry 
of Social Development (formerly the Ministry of Planning) and was 
conducted by the Social Observatory of Alberto Hurtado University. 
The survey was taken between November and December 2009 and 
included interviews of 71,460 households, corresponding to an 
expanded sample of 16,977,395 inhabitants.
7% of income, insurers have been able to charge high 
enough premiums to finance expected costs (claims 
plus administrative expenses). This has been achieved 
by offering a range of plans differentiated by premium, 
a price policy which has resulted in many high-risk, 
low-income individuals being unable to get insurance 
and migrating to the public system, fonasa. 
There are five considerations that cast doubt on the 
use of private insurance as a mechanism of universal 
access to health care and protection. Two of these have 
to do with processes of exclusion, because of the way the 
system is designed: one between the insurance regimes 
(Isapres versus fonasa), and the other within each 
regime. The third is the loss of income compensation 
capacity (loss of solidarity) by treating social security 
contributions as voluntary private contributions. The 
fourth has to do with the difficulty in finding mechanisms 
to recover solidarity. The fifth is the heavy demand on 
public resources. 
(a)  Exclusion by income (distribution) and risk (selection) 
in the Isapre system
Exclusion from the private system and migration 
to the public system occur because the Isapres’ risk 
selection mechanism pushes most of the lower-income 
and higher-risk population groups into the public system.
In table 3, Isapre affiliation rises with income level 
(by quintile). Affiliates’ real possibility of choosing 
between the public and private systems is dictated by 
their ability to pay, not by their preferences. This runs 
counter to the original spirit of the reform and shows 
that only those in the fifth quintile can really choose 
between the systems according to their own preferences.
(b) Selection by income and risk within each modality
The public health system covers 78.8% of Chile’s 
population and assumes the care of the poorest segments 
(93.2% of the first quintile). Those paying into the public 
system come under the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Health, with fonasa responsible for collecting and 
administering resources. fonasa operates as a social 
insurance, with a health plan executed by the agencies 
of the National System of Health Services and primary 
health-care establishments administered by municipal 
governments. The beneficiaries have access to this plan 
and are classified into different health groups by taxable 
income and number of dependants, from A for those who 
are indigent or without resources, to D for those with 
highest income. Thus there is one plan which works as 
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a solidarity system18 —with all benefits free for those 
with fewest resources and for the elderly— and another 
for people with more resources, whose characteristics 
are similar to a private insurance scheme with a co-
payment for care.19
Certain institutional factors entrench the effects of 
risk selection in Chile and explain why over 12 million 
are enrolled in fonasa. In fact, the existence of the free 
choice modality (mle) in fonasa encourages middle 
socioeconomic sectors into the public system, where 
they can combine the system’s two access modalities.
The private health system (financed through the 
Isapres) represents 16.5% of the population, but 44.3% 
of the individuals with most resources. Its affiliates 
have access to a health system consisting of a series of 
providers among which they may chose freely. These 
institutions administer the contributions received and, 
sometimes, also deliver the health plan agreed upon. In 
this case, and in the absence of regulation, plans were 
created according to the characteristics of each beneficiary, 
on the basis that there are separation equilibria which 
identify individuals by risk and payment capacity. Today 
51,171 different health plans20 exist with an average 
18 Under the institutional care modality (mai), beneficiaries may 
receive treatment in State establishments, where payment depends 
on their income group as defined in the Health Benefits Regime set 
forth in Law Nº 18.469.
19 Under the free choice modality, beneficiaries may seek treatment 
from private health professionals or entities, or use State establishments 
and, in this case, in-patient stay-over facilities.
20 Of the 51,171 health plans, 12,727 (24.9%) are being marketed 
(Superintendence of Health, 2011).
of 55 beneficiaries each, making it very difficult to 
compare plans as they have no common parameters. In 
terms of risk selection, it is estimated that more than 
30 pathologies are considered “pre-existent”, whereas 
fonasa does not apply this criterion.
(c) Segmentation of the mandatory premium or loss 
of income compensation (solidarity) 
Ultimately, the reform of 1981 divided access to the 
health component of social protection between rich and 
poor, by means of various sorts of selection. Seventy-nine 
percent of the poorest part of the population remains 
in the public system, which lacks the contributions the 
higher-income sectors make to the health system; thus 
income solidarity within the system is lost. 
The average level of premiums entering the 
Chilean health system from the collection of obligatory 
contributions, which could be gathered into a solidarity 
system, is quite considerable. Whereas with the average 
premium in the current public system, solidarity benefits 
up to the sixth decile, with the hypothetical average 
premium —with all affiliates contributing to a single 
system—solidarity would benefit up to the eighth decile, 
making for a clearly more egalitarian and equitable 
system21 (see figure 1). 
21  The results from the casen survey correspond to a sample and 
the information collected is, generally speaking, self-reported, so it 
includes certain biases with respect to administrative information. 
However, the conclusions are still valid insofar as the proportions are 
maintained with respect to census information. 
TABLE 3




I II III IV V Total
Public system 93.2 90.3 85.1 72.3 44.6 78.8
Forces of law and order 0.7 1.4 2.6 4.1 3.8 2.4
Isapre 1.5 3.5 6.7 16.6 44.3 13.1
None (private) 2.8 2.8 3.1 4.1 5.2 3.5
Other system 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Does not know 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.4 1.6 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of Social Development, Social Division, National Socioeconomic Survey (casen) of 2009 with expansion factors on the basis 
of the 2002 census.
(*) Does not include live-in domestic employees and their immediate family. 
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FIGURE 1
average premium, per income decile and health system























Average premium, public system
Average premium, private system
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of National Socioeconomic Survey (casen) of 2009.
According to data from the Superintendence of 
Health, the Isapres collect Ch$ 1.4 billion per year, or 
54% of the intake of the health system overall, to attend 
to only 16.5 % of the population. This represents a large 
loss of resources which could help the public health 
system to meet the objective of being more equitable 
and solidary.22 Figure 2 shows that contributions to the 
public sector are made mainly by the lower deciles, 
contrary to the private system in which contributions 
rise in the higher income deciles.
A Lorenz curve23 for Chilean’s independent income 
alongside the concentration curves for health premium 
collections clearly shows how the Chilean health system 
overall reflects income inequalities, since the concentration 
curve for the system’s total intake is very similar to the 
Lorenz curve. Breaking down the total premium collection 
by health system shows that public system collection 
corresponds to income in a more egalitarian manner, whereas 
the private system collection is clearly concentrated in the 
higher-income sectors. This gives rise to a system in which 
the poorest (concentration curve for the public system) 
22  For 2010, total collection by Isapres comprised: legal contributions, 
7% (Ch$ 976,406,000), voluntary contributions (Ch$ 365,229,000), 
employers’ contributions (Ch$ 33,599,000) and income from the 
compensation fund (Ch$ 668 million).
23  See Lorenz (1905).
contribute more to the solidarity system, while the richest 
contribute to the private system for buying individual, 
not social, insurance.24 So, in the public system —into 
which lower-income segments pay more— contributory 
solidarity applies, whereas in the private system —into 
which highest-income individuals pay— the principle of 
equivalence predominates to the detriment of solidarity. 
24  In which the premium is determined by the risk of the individual, 
not of a larger group of individuals.
(d)  Difficulty of regaining balance between equivalence 
and solidarity (explicit health-care guarantees)
These outcomes have not gone unremarked in Chile. 
But, given the political framework inherited from the 
military regime and the vested interests in the health 
system, progress with reform has been limited. One such 
reform was the Regime of Explicit Health Guarantees 
(rges), also known as the System of Universal Access 
with Explicit Guarantees (auge Plan). This aimed to 
establish a charter of health rights and duties and thus 
provide the population (regardless of socioeconomic 
status or enrolment in one health system or the other) with 
a list of health-care benefits for which the State would 
assume responsibility (see box 1). auge ensures solidary 
financing by eliminating the conflict with equivalence 
for at least one set of benefits for which the State will 
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FIGURE 2
Total contributions to the health system by income decile and health system





























Contributions to public system
Contributions to private system
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of National Socioeconomic Survey (casen) of 2009.
FIGURE 3
concentration and lorenz curves
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of National Socioeconomic Survey (casen) of 2009.
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rges is meant to establish a long-term health system. 
Regulation is supposed to: (i) establish a benchmark plan 
and largely eliminate the numerous existing plans;26 
(ii) make public hospitals more efficient and autonomous, 
and make private providers more transparent, and make 
the two more complementary and aligned with the societal 
objectives of auge; (iii) establish rules on co-payments 
and obligations, including access (which fonasa was 
already obliged to provide and Isapres are now instructed 
to provide), quality (benefits can be provided only by a 
registered and accredited provider), financial protection 
(co-payments are regulated, and in some cases must be 
zero) and timeliness of access (waiting lists for treatment 
are regulated) (Sojo, 2006).
26  Cost containment and gradual reduction of administrative expenses.
pay, a set which will be extended as resources become 
available. However, when the auge legislation was 
passed, the creation of a solidary fund was not approved. 
In order to reduce risk selection, the basic plan 
under rges includes the highest-risk diseases, increasing 
coverage and access and including guarantees of quality 
and timeliness. Private insurers may set their own price to 
reflect differences in service, benefit quality and standard 
of accommodation; they also receive a fixed payment 
through a community rating25 system for individuals 
availing themselves of auge benefits.
25  As practised by various countries, community rating is equivalent 
to a per capita payment set according to the population’s average risk 
level. This makes it imperative to take steps to bring independent and 
informal workers into the system, in order to improve the distribution 
of average risk and thereby lower average spending by the State.
BOX 1
explicit health-care guarantees plan (GES) (formerly AUGE)
The explicit health-care guarantees plan (ges) —formerly auge— seeks to avoid exclusion by morbidity status or entry 
conditions, by guaranteeing coverage by fonasa and Isapres for a number of health problems. Today ges covers 69 pathologies, 
and this range will increase over time. ges benefits apply to all these pathologies, regardless of whether they were diagnosed 
before or after the plan was set up. ges includes the right to a free preventive care check-up once a year for timely detection 
of certain diseases. The beneficiary may also have the right to free medication, depending on the particular health problem.
Diseases not included in the ges plan have the normal coverage set forth in the individual’s health plan. For certain life-
threatening, high-cost conditions, ges provides additional coverage for catastrophic illnesses (caec). In the case of fonasa 
the catastrophic conditions insurance covers 100%, i.e. there is no additional cost of the beneficiary, providing treatment is 
delivered in the institutional modality (mai). In the Isapre system, additional coverage for catastrophic illness gives affiliates 
100% coverage within the closed network of providers.
The purpose of additional coverage for catastrophic illness is to explicitly ensure: (i) access: obliging fonasa and the Isapres 
to assure health care; (ii) quality: demanding the delivery of guaranteed health care by a registered or accredited provider; 
(iii) timeliness: setting a deadline for the provision of the guaranteed care, at the stages of diagnosis, treatment and follow-up, 
and (iv) financial protection: capping the contribution, payment or co-payment the affiliate may be charged for a treatment 
or set of treatments, taking income into account.
 
In the event of a ges-covered illness, the plan is triggered in either fonasa or an Isapre, with a doctor’s certificate showing 
the diagnosis and a special form, which refers the patient to a provider for confirmation of the diagnosis. If this is confirmed, 
the patient is referred to an establishment in the network of providers.
 
Here the Isapres and fonasa operate as preferred provider organizations (ppos), with closed networks of providers for ges 
conditions. Patients may also opt to seek treatment with extra coverage from top-up plans. 
 
In the case of fonasa, payments vary by vulnerability level and are subject to caps. Isapre affiliates pay 20% of the treatment 
—according to the reference rate available in each Isapre— with a cap on contributions by number of illnesses. The health 
plan itself also carries an additional charge for access to ges. The price varies by Isapre, but averages Ch$ 5,500 per affiliate.
When timeliness and access guarantees are not fulfilled, fonasa or the Isapre in question must provide treatment through 
the network of providers.
In the event that the financial protection guarantee is not met, beneficiaries may appeal to the Superintendence of Health, 
which resolves certain disputes relating to this problem and rules on the qualification or not of a disease for ges coverage.
Source: National Health Fund (fonasa) and Ministry of Health of Chile.
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In 2010, with a view to endowing the system with the 
necessary solidarity, the State transferred to fonasa Ch$ 2.3 
billion pesos to subsidize care for the poorest sectors of 
the population (see tables 4 and 5). This is equivalent to 
an additional per capita premium of Ch$ 191,537 per year 
(Ch$ 15,961 per month) and represents almost double the 
premium paid by group B, 133% of the group C premium 
and 86% of the group D premium. Of this amount, 39% is 
allocated to coverage for the poorest. Among those who 
pay into the system and are enrolled with fonasa, the 
most generous contribution goes to groups B (37.1%) and 
D (16.7%). Group C benefits least, with 7.6%. 
(e)  Implications for public finances in the future
As Panel A of figure 4 shows, age is a key factor 
in risk selection. Isapres show a clear tendency to select 
by age, as is evident in Panel B. 
Chile is going through the final stages of the 
fertility translation. It will be another decade before 
the demographic dependency ratio begins to rise, but 
the proportion of older adults has already risen (Uthoff, 
2010). If the current trends as regards risk selection and 
solidarity financing continue, it is likely that:
- Age groups with greater health-risk factors will 
increase vis-à-vis the rest of the population. The 
composition of the growing age groups in relation 
to the working-age population will change, as well, 
with fewer children and more older persons (see 
figure 5). This will significantly increase spending 
on health and pensions.
- The State will have to increase financing for the 
system owing to the coming demographic shift.
- Public health spending needs will rise significantly 
(see figure 6). 
- Affiliations will tend increasingly to migrate to 
public health insurance, owing to the effects of 
risk section by sex and age by the Isapres.
TABLE 4





















A 903 905 0 0 903 905 0 0   903 905 903 905
B 1 202 725 121 444 12 694 1 336 863 406 022 60 554   870 287 1 336 863
C 441 918 66 116 6 911 514 945 314 117 21 662   179 166 514 945
D 736 937 160 418 16 768 914 123 464 448 57 034   392 641 914 123
Total 3 285 485 347 978 36 373 3 669 836 1 184 587 139 251 0 2 345 998 3 669 836
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of:
– Statistics and budget statements of the National Health Fund (fonasa) and the National System of Health Services (snss).
–  National Socioeconomic Survey (casen) of 2006, Ministry of Social Development.
Notes:
(1)  Does not include spending on public health goods and investments.
(2)  Incidences of medical treatment: corresponds to spending on both institutional care and free choice modalities (mai and mle). Does not 
include municipal contributions for primary care.
(3)  Work incapacity allowance (sil): includes sil expenditures by Regional Ministerial Offices (seremi) and Family Allowance Funds (ccaf).
(3)  Administrative costs: corresponds to internal operating expenditures by fonasa.
(4)  Since main fonasa spending efforts are concentrated in the free choice modality (mle) and sil, and the distribution of administrative costs 
goes mainly to these items, the allocation of these expenditures to group A affiliates receiving these benefits is very marginal and is assumed 
to be nil for the purposes of this study. 
(5)  Contributions: affiliates’ contribution of 7% of income. Includes 0.6% which goes directly to ccaf.
(6)  Co-payments: corresponds to co-payments for mle and for the explicit guarantees (ges) plan, assuming 10% snss income as co-payment 
for the institutional care system (mai). 
(7)  Group subsidies: since the expenditures of each health group are far higher than the affiliate contributions and co-payments, subsidies are 
non-existent.
(8)  State contribution: contributions to fonasa from taxes and from the Chile crece contigo programme, and municipal contribution to primary 
health care. 
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TABLE 5





























A 234 114 0 0 234 114 0 0   234 114 234 114
B 292 049 29 489 3 082 324 620 98 591 14 704   211 325 324 620
C 202 148 30 244 3 161 235 553 143 687 9 909   81 956 235 552
D 353 796 77 015 8 050 438 861 222 977 27 381   188 503 438 861
Total 1 082 107 136 748 14 293 123 3148 465 255 51 994 0 715 898 1 233 147
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of:
– Statistics and budget statements of the National Health Fund (fonasa) and the National System of Health Services (snss).
–  National Socioeconomic Survey (casen) of 2006, Ministry of Social Development.
Notes:
(1)  Does not include spending on public health goods and investments.
(2)  Incidences of medical treatment: corresponds to spending on both institutional care and free choice modalities. Does not include municipal 
contributions for primary care.
(3)  Work incapacity allowance (sil): includes sil expenditures by Regional Ministerial Offices (seremi) and Family Allowance Funds (ccaf).
(3)  Administrative costs: corresponds to internal operating expenditures by fonasa.
(4)  Since main fonasa spending efforts are concentrated in the free choice modality (mle) and sil, and the distribution of administrative costs 
goes mainly to these items, the allocation of these expenditures to group A affiliates receiving these benefits is very marginal and is assumed 
to be nil for the purposes of this study. 
(5)  Contributions: affiliates’ contribution of 7% of income. Includes 0.6% which goes directly to ccaf.
(6)  Co-payments: corresponds to co-payments for mle and for the explicit guarantees (ges) plan, assuming 10% snss income as co-payment 
for the institutional care system (mai). 
(7) Group subsidies: since the expenditures of each health group are far higher than the affiliate contributions and co-payments, subsidies are 
non-existent.
(8) State contribution: contributions to fonasa from taxes and from the Chile crece contigo programme, and municipal contribution to primary 
health care. 
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Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Health of Chile on affiliation, risk factors by sex and age and five-year 
age groups in relation to per capita cost.
FIGURE 5
population by age group relative to the population aged 20-65






























































Infant (under age 4) 
Young (aged between 5 and 39)
Adults (aged between 40 and 64)
Older persons (aged between 65 and 79)
Elderly (aged 80 or over) 
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of population estimates and projections by age from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic 
Centre (celade)-Population Division of eclac.
Figure 4 (concluded)
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FIGURE 6
effect of demographic trends on public health spending and affiliation
projected total health spending as a percentage of GDP









































































































Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Health (minsal), the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic 
Centre (celade)-Population Division of eclac and the Central Bank of Chile.
gdp: gross domestic product.
c e p a l  r e v i e w  1 0 8  •  d e c e m b e r  2 0 1 2158
THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: LESSONS ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EQUIVALENCE  
and solidarity • andras Uthoff, José MigUel sánchez and rolando caMpUsano
As public health schemes, competitive markets for 
individual health insurance are running into difficulties 
the world over, as a result of pricing policy that tends 
to set premiums on the basis of foreseeable individual 
losses (i.e. according to the principle of equivalence). 
In the absence of proper regulation, this policy forces 
insurers to select risk and therefore to exclude the poor 
or those with high risk. This runs counter to the universal 
coverage required of a public system (i.e. the principle 
of solidarity).
The experience in countries which apply this sort 
of policy (Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, among others) is that risk and income 
solidarity have to be factored into the insurance market 
in order to achieve universal coverage. To this end, all 
these countries have implemented some sort of risk-
adjusted premium subsidy (or risk equalization among 
risk groups), together with strict regulation of the direct 
premiums paid to insurers by affiliates. In all cases, 
these risk-adjustment mechanisms are imperfect and, 
according to expert opinion, they must be improved if 
insurance markets are to remain operational. 
In Chile, as part of public health funding, a public 
insurance with income-based contributions was launched 
and private administration of health insurance was 
allowed through individual contracts. The idea was 
to reduce State involvement in health care and move 
towards a system of individual insurance. An obligatory 
premium was set (to avoid adverse selection) at 7% of 
independent income and the health system was opened 
to private operators. 
In principle, with strictly regulated risk adjustment, 
contributions by income level could produce vertical 
and horizontal equity by inducing redistribution from 
healthy to sick, and from rich to poor. Without appropriate 
regulation, however, this new health insurance market 
encouraged insurers to give priority to the principle of 
equivalence, adapting premiums to expected costs and 
thereby generating heavy direct and indirect risk selection 
and contravening the principle of solidarity (of cross-
subsidies from rich to poor and from healthy to sick). 
Today there are over 50,000 private health plans in 
the market, differentiated by individual risk. This has 
led to market-skimming and allowed the development 
of a dual model, with a private insurance market for the 
rich and public insurance for everyone else. The private 
market offers plans that are excessive in relation to real 
needs, with clear surpluses, while the public insurance 
covers 78% of the population, including those with 
lowest incomes and highest risk (including women of 
childbearing age, the chronically ill, the elderly and the 
poor). In the public system, indigents have no option 
other than public health provision, while non-indigent 
can opt for free choice modalities with co-payment. 
The private system has no risk equalization mechanism 
and displays serious problems of risk selection, with 
plans varying by mandatory premium and the affiliate’s 
voluntary top-up. 
The auge-ges system provides explicit guarantees 
by substantially reducing out-of-pocket expenditure. But 
problems remain with private insurers skimming risk from 
the public sector. Between 2005 when the ges system 
was set up and mid-2010, 12 times more guarantees 
were processed in the public system than in the private 
system, while the public system population numbered 
only five times the population in the private system. 
This bears out the hypothesis of skimming and shows 
that the public system comprises not only the poorest 
and most vulnerable, but also those with highest risk, 
including the chronically ill and the elderly (of whom 
90% are in the public sector (Erazo, 2011)).
The financing of the Chilean system needs to be 
rethought in order to even out these inequalities. The 
current situation, far from reducing State involvement, 
engages the State even more heavily and, what is more, 
does so in a way that does not fully balance equivalence 
with solidarity. The solution necessarily lies in either 
consolidating the contributions from all affiliates 
(Isapres and fonasa) under a social security rationale or 
considering a tax reform. In either case, better regulation 
of the system is needed to delineate risk-adjustment 
schemes and guarantee basic packages of benefits. 
V 
conclusions and final remarks
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